Introduction
Computation of optimal fiscal policies for Lucas and Stokey's (1983) economy requires repeated evaluations of the present value of the government's surplus, an object formally equivalent to an asset price. The functional equation for an asset price is typically difficult to solve. In this paper, we specify a linear-quadratic version of Lucas and Stokey's economy, making both asset pricing computations and optimal fiscal policy calculations easy. The key steps are described in Appendix for two basic kinds of stochastic process: a stochastic first-order linear difference equation and a Markov chain. We use the LucasStokey economy to exhibit features of Lucas and Stokey's model, and how they compare to Barro's (1979) tax-smoothing model.
1

Review of Barro's model
Robert Barro (1979) formalized the idea that taxes should be smooth by saying that they should be a martingale, regardless of the stochastic process for government expenditures. Hansen, Sargent, and Roberds (1991) 
subject to an initial condition B 0 and
where T t , g t , b t denote tax collections, government expenditures, and the stock of riskfree government debt, respectively, and where R is a gross risk-free rate of return on government debt and β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor. In (2), γ(L) and ρ(L) are stable onesided polynomials in nonnegative powers of the lag operator L, w t is a scalar martingale difference sequence adapted to its own history. Under the assumption that Rβ = 1, the 1 The asset pricing calculations emanate from Hansen (1987) and Hansen and Sargent (1999) .
solution of this problem that satisfies the side condition E 0 ∞ t=0 β t T 2 t < +∞ is a rule for taxes of the form
Using (3) with (2) shows that B t+1 is cointegrated with T t .
2 Equation (3) asserts the striking property that the serial correlation properties of taxes are independent of the serial correlation properties of government expenditures.
That a random walk with small innovation variance appears smooth is the sense of 'tax smoothing' that emerges from Barro's analysis. This outcome depends on the debt being risk-free.
The second equation of (2) can be written
where π t+1 is interpretable as the payoff on government debt in excess of the risk-free rate.
Barro's model has T t adjust permanently by a small amount in response to a surprise in g t , w t , and has B t+1 make the rest of the adjustment to enforce (4) period by period. These adjustments make the cumulative excess payoff to government creditors be
The adjustments are very different in Lucas and Stokey's model. Lucas and Stokey (1983) reexamined the optimal taxation problem in an equilibrium economy with complete markets, where the government issues state-contingent debt, not only the risk-free debt in (2). In their analysis, tax-smoothing in the form emphasized by Barro does not emerge. Taxes are not a martingale but rather have serial correlation
properties that mirror those of government expenditures. A martingale lurks in their analysis, but as a counterpart to (5) for the cumulated excess payoff to the government's creditors, not taxes, and only after appropriate adjustments for risk and risk aversion.
Lucas and Stokey's Model
We present a linear quadratic version of Lucas and Stokey's (1983) model of optimal taxation in an economy without capital and a compute a variety of examples.
Exogenous processes and information
Let x t be an exogenous information vector. We shall use x t to drive exogenous stochastic processes g t , d t , b t , 0 s t , representing, respectively, government expenditures, an endowment, a preference shock, and a stream of promised coupon payments owed by the government at the beginning of time 0:
We make one of two alternative assumptions about the underlying stochastic process
Assumption 1: The process x t is an n × 1 vector with given initial condition x 0 and is governed by
Here {w t+1 } is a martingale difference sequence adapted to its own past and to x 0 , and A is a stable matrix.
Assumption 2: The process x t is an n state Markov chain with transition probabilities arranged in the n × n matrix P with P ij = Prob(x t+1 =x j |x t =x i ).
Technology
There is a technology for converting one unit of labor ℓ t into one unit of a single nonstorable consumption good. Feasible allocations satisfy:
Households
Markets are complete. At time 0, a representative consumer faces a scaled ArrowDebreu price system 3 {p 0 t } and a flat rate tax on labor {τ t }. and chooses consumption and labor supply to maximize:
subject to the time 0 budget constraint
This states that the present value of consumption equals the present value of the endowment plus coupon payments on the initial government debt plus after tax labor earnings.
The scaled Arrow-Debreu prices are ordinary state prices divided by discount factors and conditional probabilities. The scaled Arrow-Debreu price system is a stochastic process.
Government
The government's time 0 budget constraint is
Given the government expenditure process and the present value E 0 ∞ t=0 β t p 0 t 0 s t , a feasible tax process must satisfy (11).
Equilibrium
Definition: L 2 0 is the space of random variables y t measurable with respect to x t and such that E 0 ∞ t=0 β t y 2 t < +∞.
Definitions: A feasible allocation is a stochastic process {c t , ℓ t } that satisfies (8). A tax system is a scalar stochastic process {τ t }. A price system is a stochastic process {p 0 t }. The time t elements of each of these processes are assumed to be measurable with respect to x t , and to belong to L 2 0 .
Definition: An equilibrium is a feasible allocation, a price system, and a tax system that have the following properties:
i. Given the tax and price systems, the allocation solves the household's problem.
ii. Given the price system, the allocation and the tax system satisfy the government's budget constraint.
Properties
The first-order conditions for the household's problem imply that the equilibrium price system satisfies p 0 t = µ(b t − c t ), where µ is a numeraire that we set at b 0 − c 0 . The preference specification permits the scaled Arrow-Debreu price p 0 t to be expressed in terms of ratios of linear functions of the state:
where M p is a matrix defined so that M p x t = b t − c t . The preference specification will make it possible to express government time t revenues as the ratio of a quadratic function of the state at t to a linear function of the state at 0. The forms of these prices and taxes, together with the other objects in (9), reduce the technical problem to evaluating geometric sums of a quadratic form in the state. For assumptions 1 and 2, Appendix A shows how to compute such sums.
Ramsey problem
There are many equilibria, indexed by tax systems. The Ramsey problem is to choose the tax system that delivers the equilibrium preferred by the representative household. The Ramsey problem assumes that at time 0 the government commits itself to the tax system, once and for all.
Definition: The Ramsey problem is to choose an equilibrium that maximizes the household's welfare (9). The allocation that solves this problem is called the Ramsey allocation, and the associated tax system is called the Ramsey plan.
Solution strategy
In solving the Ramsey problem, the government chooses all of the objects in an equilibrium, subject to the constraint on the equilibrium imposed by its budget constraint.
Following a long line of researchers starting with Frank Ramsey (1929), we shall solve this problem using a 'first-order' approach that involves the following steps. The steps incorporate the properties required by the definition of equilibrium.
1. Obtain the first-order conditions for the household's problem and use them to express the tax system and the price system in terms of the allocation alone.
2. Substitute the expressions for the tax system and the price system obtained in step 1 into the government's budget constraint to obtain a single iso-perimetric restriction on allocations.
3. Use Lagrangian methods to find the feasible allocation that maximizes the utility of the representative household subject to the restriction derived in step 2. The maximizer is the Ramsey allocation.
4. Use the expressions from step 1 to find the associated Ramsey equilibrium price and tax systems by evaluating them at the Ramsey allocation.
Computation
We now execute these four steps. The problem is set so that the mathematics of linear systems can support a solution.
Step 1. The household's first order conditions imply
Step 2. Using (12) and (13) express (11) as
Equation (14) is often called the implementability constraint on the allocation.
Step 3. Consider the maximization problem associated with the Lagrangian:
where λ 0 is the multiplier associated with the government's budget constraint, and µ 0t
is the multiplier associated with the time t feasibility condition. Obtain the first-order conditions:
We want to solve equations (15a), (15b), (15c) and the government's budget constraint (11) for an allocation. Our strategy is to begin by taking λ 0 as given and to solve (15) for an allocation contingent on λ 0 . Then we shall use (11) to solve for λ 0 .
Using the feasibility constraint c t = d t + ℓ t − g t , we can express (15a), (15b) as
We also derive
We have:
where, for convenience, we define
Using (16), the general term of (14) can be written as:
where we used the fact that 2l t = b t − d t + g t and the fact thatl t = b t −c t to reduce the bracketed factor in the second line.
This allows us to write (14) as:
where
and
where the fact that b t −c t =l t was used. The 0 subscripts on the forms a 0 and b 0 denote their dependence on 0 S s . The coefficients in the polynomial expression of (18) only functions of x 0 alone because, given the law of motion for the exogenous state x t , the infinite sums can be computed using the algorithms described in Appendix A.
Notice that b 0 (x 0 ), when expressed by (20), is simply the infinite sum on the lefthand side of (14) evaluated for the specific allocation {c t ,l t }. That allocation solves the problem:
In other words, {c t ,l t } is the allocation that would be chosen by a social planner, or the Ramsey allocation when the government can resort to lumpsum taxation. The term b 0 (x 0 ) is the present-value of the government stream spending commitments {g t + 0 s t }, evaluated at the prices corresponding to the {c t ,l t } allocation.
If that present value is 0, distortionary taxation is not necessary, and µ = 0 (that is, λ 0 = 0) solves (18): the government's budget constraint is not binding. One configuration for which b 0 (x 0 ) = 0 is when g t = − 0 s t for all t, but there are many others. Because markets are complete, the timing of the government's claims on the household does not matter. If the government were able to acquire such claims on the private sector in a non-distortionary way, it would be able to implement a first-best allocation.
When the net present value of the government's commitments is positive, we must solve (18) for a µ in (0, 1/2), corresponding to λ 0 > 0. The polynomial a 0 (x 0 )µ(1 − µ)
is bounded above by a 0 (x 0 )/4, which means that government commitments that are "too large" cannot be supported by a Ramsey plan. If b 0 (x 0 ) < a 0 (x 0 )/4 there exists a unique solution µ in (0, 1/2) and a unique λ 0 > 0. The Ramsey allocation can then be computed as:
and the Ramsey plan as:
Expression (23) shows how the stochastic properties of the tax rate mirror those for government expenditures when the endowment and the preference shocks are constant.
Martingale returns on government debt
Recursive formulation of the government budget
The government's budget constraint can be written
t 0 s t is the time 0 present value of initial government debt obligations. Define
Along the Ramsey allocation, B t can be computed as
which can evidently be expressed as a function of the time t state x t in particular, a quadratic form in x t plus a constant divided by a linear form in x t . The quantity B t can be regarded as the time t value of government state contingent debt issued at t − 1 and priced at t.
The government budget constraint can be be implemented recursively by issuing one-period state contingent debt represented as a stochastic process B t that is measurable with respect to time t information. In particular, we can replace the single budget constraint (11) with the sequence of budget constraints for t ≥ 0:
is the scaled Arrow-Debreu state price for one-period ahead claims at time t. We can think of the optimal plan as being implemented as follows. The government comes into period t with state contingent debt worth B t , all of which it buys back or 'redeems'. It pays for these redemptions and its time t net of interest deficit g t − τ t ℓ t by selling state contingent debt worth E t βp t t+1 B t+1 . The term structure of this debt is irrelevant (but see Appendix B). We are free to think of it all as one-period state contingent debt promising to pay off B t+1 state-contingent units of consumption at t + 1.
The martingale equivalent measure Equation (27) looks like an asset pricing equation. The value of the asset at time t is B t and the time t 'dividend' is the government surplus τ t ℓ t − g t . Because we are working with complete markets, we can coax from (27) a martingale that forms a counterpart to (4) and (5).
4 The argument proceeds as follows. We would like it if (25), the asset pricing equation, involved so-called risk neutral pricing by collapsing to
where R tj is the risk free j-period gross rate of return from time t to time t + j. The j period risk free rate is E t β j p t t+j , but (25) does not imply (28), at least not under rational expectations (where E is taken with respect to the correct transition probabilities). But by computing the expectation in (28) with respect to another set of transition probabilities, we can make a version of (28) true.
Here is how to find transition probabilities that work. Note that the one-period risk free interest rate R t satisfies R
. Consider a portfolio of formed by borrowing (B t − (τ t ℓ t − g t )), and using the proceeds to buy the vector of one-period claims B t+1 . The one-period profits from that portfolio will be
This investment costs no money, so that if risk-neutral investors' evaluations determined prices, the expected value of the payoff should be zero. (Remember that in Barro's model, the corresponding object is identically zero, not just zero in conditional expectation.) But the representative household is risk-averse, and its preferences are reflected in state prices, making risk neutral pricing fail, at least with the correct specification of probabilities. We can induce a risk-neutral pricing formula by suitably respecifying the probabilities. In particular, equations (27)- (29) state that
whereẼ t is the conditional expectation with respect to the equivalent transition measure defined asf
where f (x t+1 |x t ) is the original Markov transition density for x. The transition measuref is equivalent in the sense of putting positive probability on the same events as f . Condition (30) states that π t+1 is a martingale difference sequence with respect to the equivalent transition measure.
5
The martingale characterization of government debt encapsulates features of a variety of examples calculated by Lucas and Stokey (1983) in which surprise increases in government expenditures are associated with low realized returns on government debt, and low government expenditures are associated with high rates of return. We now turn to some examples of our own.
Three examples
All 
with ρ = .7, µ g = .35 and C g = .035 1 − ρ 2 . The second example also uses assumption 1 and sets
where ρ = .95 and C g = .7 1 − ρ 2 .
The third example uses assumption 2 and sets the Markov chain
The profit or gain Π t = P t s=1 π s is a martingale with respect to the measure over sequences of x t induced by the equivalent transition density. We defineΠ t = P t s=0 π s . We calculated Ramsey plans for each of these three economies. We wrote a matlab program lqramsey for the assumption 1 economies and lqramsm for the assumption 2 economies. Figures 1, 2 , and 3 display simulations of outcome paths.
The first panel of each case shows sample paths with tax smoothing, not in the sense of Barro, but in the sense of 'small variance'. As formula (23) shows, taxes inherit serial correlation properties from the government expenditure process. The second and fourth is the factor that π t needs to be multipied to convert Π t into the martingaleΠ t . The factor is small, meaning that Π t itself is nearly a martingale. Note howΠ t becomes a constant once perpetual peace arrives in 
Extensions
Further calculations with linear quadratic economies appear in Hansen (1987) and Hansen and Sargent (1999) . Extensions of Lucas and Stokey's analysis to economies with capital appear in Kehoe (1994, 1996) and Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) . Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994) describe optimal policy in terms of a martingale of a return variable related to Π t . For an analysis intermediate between Barro's and Lucas and Stokey's, see Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala (1996) , who restrict the government in Lucas and Stokey's model to issue only risk-free debt. That limitation puts a large number of additional measurability restrictions on the Ramsey allocation, beyond those incorporated in (14). These restrictions deliver a version of (5) with a time-varying risk free interest rate. The problem with only risk free debt requires computational methods like ones of Marcet and Marimon (1997) .
Appendix A: Geometric sums of quadratic forms
The calculations in the text require repeated evaluations of discounted infinite sums of quadratic forms in future values of the state. This appendix gives formulas for these sums under two alternative specifications of stochastic process for the state: (1) the state is governed by a vector first order linear stochastic difference equation; and (2) the state evolves according to an n state Markov chain.
Linear stochastic difference equation
We want a formula for expected discounted sums of quadratic forms
and where w t+1 is a martingale difference sequence adapted to its own history and to x 0 .
The formula is
The second equation is a Sylvester equation in Q that can be solved by one of a variety of methods, including the doubling algorithm. See Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan, and Sargent (1996) for a review of methods for solving Sylvester equations. The standard Matlab program dlyap can be used; so can a homemade one doubleo of Hansen and Sargent (1999) .
Markov chain
Assume that x t is the state of an n-state Markov chain with transition matrix P with (i, j)th element P i,j = Prob(x t+1 =x j |x t =x i ). Herex i is the value of x when the chain is in its ith state. Let h(x) be a function of the state represented by an (n × 1) vector h; the ith component of h denotes the value of h when x is in its ith state. Then we have the following two useful formulas:
where β ∈ (0, 1) guarantees existence of (I − βP ) −1 = (I + βP + β 2 P 2 + . . .).
Appendix B: Time consistency and the structure of debt
Under complete markets, there are many government debt structures that have the same present value. One of the results of Lucas and Stokey (1983) is that a specific structure is required if the Ramsey plan is to be time-consistent; that is, if the Ramsey plan computed at t = 1 coincides with the continuation of the Ramsey plan computed at t = 0 for all realizations of x 1 . We can compute the debt structure that will induce time consistency.
Assume that the government has solved for the Ramsey plan at t = 0, and restructured the debt, that is, chosen a new debt structure of the form 1 s t = 1 S s x t . We want to find conditions on 1 S s such that the Ramsey plan found at time t = 0 will be timeconsistent. Suppose that, for t = 1, we compute the Ramsey plan. Following the same procedure as above, we will need to solve for µ 1 in the equation
where the subscript on a and b indicates the fact that these quadratic forms of x 1 depend on 1 S s just as a 0 (x 0 ) and b 0 (x 0 ) depend on 0 S s in (19) and (21). Once µ 1 is found, allocations can be computed using (22). Note that thel t andc t terms in (16) do not depend on the debt structure. Therefore, for the new Ramsey allocation to coincide with the continuation of the Ramsey allocation computed at t = 0, all we need is
To translate these conditions into conditions on 1 S s alone, we use (35) to substitute 1 S s in (34), solve for µ 1 as a function of x 1 , and then replace µ 1 in (35).
Rewrite (35) as
Using (36) in the definition of a 1 (x 1 ):
we find that
For convenience, write b 1 (x 1 ) = c(x 1 ) + d 1 (x 1 ) with
The term c(x 1 ) does not depend on 1 S s , and the term d 1 (x 1 ) can be rewritten, using (36), as:
We now replace a 1 and d 1 in (34) and solve for µ 1 : .
If we examine (37), we see that 1 S s will not be independent of x 1 except when the forms a 1 , c and d 1 are, in fact, constants with respect to x 1 . A sufficient condition for this to hold is that b t , d t and 0 s t be independent of t. When that obtains, the second term in (37) is zero (by (18)) and the time-consistent debt structure will be given by:
